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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
(2) that a statute, especially a criminal statute, must have been directed to-
ward acts within the contemplation of the legislature when enacted.' 5
There is considerable force to the first branch of the dissent when it is
remembered that Art. I, including section 2, deals with the organization and
powers of Congress and not, as do some other provisions of the Constitution,
with individual rights and privileges as such.18 So too, the second branch
of the dissent is in keeping with the desirable policy of narrowly construing
criminal statutes rather than extending their text beyond their context at
the time of enactment.' 7  J. E.
COPYRIGHT-FAIR US--FEDERAL RoLs-[Federal]. -Plaintiff, the New
York Herald-Tribune, editorially defended Wendell L. Wiikie, the Repub-
lican presidential candidate, against charges that he was closely associated
with Wall Street. In a communication to the newspaper, defendant, Otis &
Company, reprimanded it for assuming that any affiliation was to be dis-
avowed. This letter was acknowledged but never referred to in the news-
paper. Thereupon the defendant addressed a circular letter to a select list
of public officials, bankers, educators, economists, and other persons, en-
closing a photostatic copy of the editorial page, including the masthead,
of plaintiff's copyrighted newspaper. Plaintiffs brought an action for al-
leged infringement of copyright and trademark. The defendant filed mo-
tions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, supported by affdavits
claiming "fair use" of the copyrighted material. Held: The determination
of "fair use" is not to be decided on motion and affidavits, but is to be left
to the trial judge on the merits of the case. New York Tiibune v. Otis &
Company.,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(b),2 permit some objec-
tions to the contentions of an opposing party to be raised by a motion for
summary judgment supported by affidavits. The decision in the instant
case, however, goes no further than to hold that "fair use" is a defense
of such complexity, and so dependent upon particular facts, that it can be
raised only by answer and proved only in a full trial before judge or jury.
The decision seems reasonable, when the vagueness of the conception
15. See United States v. Gradwell (1917) 243 U. S. 476 in which the
court held that conspiracies to defraud in a primary election are not within
the purview of §19 of the Criminal Code, because when §19 was passed by
Congress, primary elections were unknown in the law.
16. U. S. Const. Amend. XIV. See Nixon v. Herndon (1927) 273 U. S.
536; Nixon v. Condon (1932) 286 U. S. 73; note 12, supra; U. S. Const.
Amend. XV. See Guinn v. U. S. (1915) 238 U. S. 347, note 12, supra. These
cases were thus distinguished by Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent, 61 S. Ct.
1030, 1046.
17. McBoyle v. U. S. (1931) 283 U. S. 25.
1. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 67.
2. "FoR DEFENDING PARTY. A party against whom a claim, counter-
claim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may,
at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof."
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"fair use'' 3 is taken into account. Under the constitutional grant 4 to
Congress of power to secure to authors an exclusive right to their writings,
and under the statutes5 which Congress has enacted in the exercise of that
power, authors are assured of protection against "piracy" or wholesale
unauthorized reproduction of their works. Nevertheless, at the other ex-
treme, in everyday intercourse some unauthorized republications necessarily
occur. The doctrine of "fair use"8 has been developed in an effort to sift
from among such publications those which are detrimental to the author's
rights.7 The rest are not treated as infringements.8
The determination of "fair use" depends upon the facts of each case.0
If the object of the reviewer be a critical evaluation, the law permits a
sufficient copying and publication to show the merits or demerits of the
work in order to give a correct impression.' 0 It has been held, for example,
that subsequent writers may quote,11 review,12 and criticize-s without in-
3. "A copyrighted work is subject to fair criticism, serious or humorous.
So far as it is necessary to that end, quotations may be made from it, and
it may be described by words, representations, pictures, or suggestions. It
is not always easy to say where the line should be drawn between the use
which for such purposes is permitted and that which is forbidden." Hill v.
Whalen and Martell, Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 220 Fed. 359, 360.
4. U. S. Const. Art. I, §8: "The Congress shall have power: * * * To
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writ-
ings and discoveries."
5. (1831) 4 Stat 436, c. 16; (1856) 11 Stat. 138, c. 169; (1870) 16
Stat. 198, c. 230; (1909) 35 Stat. 1075, c. 320, 17 U. S. C. A. §1.
6. The strict meaning of "fair use" is "a use technically forbidden by
the law, but allowed as reasonable and customary, on the theory that the
author must have foreseen and tacitly consented." De Wolf, An Outline of
Copyright (1925) 143.
7. Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1905) 140
Fed. 539; West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co. (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1909)
169 Fed. 833, modified in (C. C. A. 2, 1910) 176 Fed. 833; Stephens v.
Howells Sales Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 805; Henry Holt &
Co. v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1938) 23 F. Supp.
302. Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice (1936) 775, c. 22, §13 on the
limits of "fair use."
8. Harper v. Shoppel (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) 26 Fed. 519; Hill v.
Whalen & Martell, Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 220 Fed. 359; G. Ricordi
& Co. v. Mason (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911) 201 Fed. 182, aff'd (C. C. A. 2,
1913) 210 Fed. 277; Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Pub. Corp. (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 817.
9. Sims v. Stanton (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1896) 75 Fed. 6. See Folsom v.
Marsh (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) Fed. Cas. No. 4901.
10. The view that a writer may copy to a reasonable extent in order
to give a correct idea of the whole is enunciated in: Story v. Holcombe
(C. C. D. Ohio 1847) Fed. Cas. No. 13,497; Lawrence v. Dana (C. C. D.
Mass. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 8136.
11. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Mason (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911) 201 Fed. 182,
aff'd (C. C. A. 2, 1913) 210 Fed. 277; Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc.
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 220 Fed. 359; Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Pub.
Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 817. See Folsom v. Marsh
(C. C. D. Mass. 1841) Fed. Cas. No. 4901; Lawrence v. Dana (C. C. D.
Mass. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 8136.
12. Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1903) 125 Fed. 977,
where parody within the limits of "fair use" is accepted as a form of review;
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curring liability for infringement. Such permitted use, however, is subject
to the general limitation that the republication must not be so extensive
as to substantially injure the original work1 4 and must be for some legiti-
mate purpose. 15 The natural question whether the defendant's intention
has any significance in cases of "fair use," cannot be dogmatically answered.
Some authorities hold that a mere want of intention to infringe is not a
defense,'8 but there are dicta indicating that the defendant's intention is
to be considered in determining whether a "fair use" has been made.y
In the recent case of Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Pub. Corp.,18 the
District Court of New York had occasion to review rather fully the factors
to be considered in determining whether the defendant had established a
valid defense of "fair use." The court in that case held that the publication
of part of the plaintiff's copyrighted song "Poor Pauline" in connection
with the passing of the once famous actress Pearl White was a "fair use."
It considered, in arriving at this result, the following factors: (1) the
extent and relative value of the extracts; (2) purpose and whether quoted
portions might be used as a substitute for the original work; (3) the effect
upon the distribution and objects of the original work. It may well be
G. Ricordi & Co. v. Mason (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911) 201 Fed. 182, aff'd
(C. C. A. 2, 1913) 210 Fed. 277. Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice
(1936) 754, c. 22, §7.
13. Harper v. Shoppel (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886) 26 Fed. 519. Hill v.
Whalen & Martell, Inc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1914) 220 Fed. 359. In Folsom
v. Marsh (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) Fed. Cas. No. 4901, at 344, the court said:
"Thus, for example, no one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely
from the original work, if his design be really and truly to use passages
for purposes of fair and reasonable criticism."
14. The court, in Lawrence v. Dana (C. C. D. Mass. 1869) Fed. Gas.
No. 8136, at 61, said: "The purpose of fair use is to limit privileges so
that it shall not be exercised to an extent to work substantial injury to
the property which is under the legal protection of copyright." The follow-
ing limitation is, apparently, recognized: "However the reduction in demand
due to criticism, and not to the excessive quotations, constitutes no cause
of action for copyright infringement." Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice
(1936) 777. The authority cited is Hill v. Whalen and Martell, Inc. (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1914) 220 Fed. 359.
15. Note 8, supra.
16. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. (1931) 283 U. S. 191; Fishel v.
Lueckel (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1892) 53 Fed. 499; Witmark & Sons v. Galloway
(D. C. E. D. Tenn. N. D. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 412; Pathe Exchange v. Internat'l
Alliance, etc. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1932) 3 F. Supp. 63; Johns & Johns
Printing Go. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp. (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 102 F. (2d)
282; Advertisers Exchange v. Laufe (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 1.
17. Lawrence v. Dana (C. C. D. Mass. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 8136. The
court said at page 60: "Evidence of innocent intention may have a bearing
upon the question of 'fair use'." Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice
(1986) 781, cites the aforementioned case and states the rule as follows:
"While it is not required to prove that the infringement was committed
intentionally * * * evidence of innocent intention does enter into the deter-
mination whether a use made of a copyrighted work was a fair one." The
principal case also refers to Lawrence v. Dana as authority for the proposi-
tion that intent is to be considered in determining whether "fair use" is
present
18. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 817.
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questioned whether the daily newspaper published by the plaintiff in the
instant case suffered harm under any of these tests, since its claim upon
public interest is merely temporary. Nevertheless, the court had difficult
issues of fact before it and acted correctly in reserving to the plaintiff the
right of cross-examination and other safeguards given in a trial for the
purpose of determining the facts. N. B. K.
EVDECE-INFER-NCE UPON AN INFMaENC-[Missouri] .- Plaintiff sued
defendant insurance company on a double indemnity, or accidental death
benefit, provision in a life insurance policy. Plaintiff contended that the
insured died as a result of an accidental fall from a stepladder which caused
a rupture of the spleen. Although there were no eyewitnesses to the fall,
there was evidence to the effect that on the night of the alleged accident,
the insured had been putting up colored bulbs in front of his house with
the aid of a stepladder. The stepladder was found the next day with one
of the legs broken off. A splinter of wood, allegedly from the ladder, was
taken out of the insured's leg. Plaintiff testified that on the day after the
fall, insured showed her bruises on his chest, over his heart, and on his
leg and that there were also bruises along his left side, and discoloration
over his abdomen. Insured's doctor testified, that in his opinion, insured
died as a result of a rupture of the spleen. Insured had been active, ener-
getic, and in apparent good health for some time prior to the injury. De-
fendant contended that the evidence presented was insufficient; that plain-
tiff could not establish her case without building an inference upon an
inference, which defendant contended was not permitted. Held: That the
rule against building an inference upon an inference has been modified to
the extent that it is now permitted in order to arrive at a conclusion, so
long as the result is not too remote. Krug v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
New York. 2
Until very recently, the Missouri court has refused to recognize that an
inference might be based upon an inference in order to prove an ultimate
fact.3 Rather, it has invariably said that the "piling" of inferences would
not be permitted. On the other hand, there seems to have been no limit to
1. The defendant contended that plaintiff must show (1) that insured
-was standing on the ladder on the particular night, (2) while thereon he
was caused to fall by the accidental breaking of the ladder, (3) that he
sustained bodily injuries as a result of the breaking of the ladder and the
lall, (4) that the bodily injuries were evidenced by visible contusions or
wounds on the body as required by the insurance policy, and (5) that as a
result of such bodily injuries, and independently and exclusively of all other
causes, the insured died. It was argued by the defendant that each of
these steps was an inference and had to be proved by fact and not estab-
lished by inferences drawn from previous inferences.
2. (Mo. App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 393.
3. Wright v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America (1915)
188 Mo. App. 457, 174 S. W. 833; Atherton v. Railway Mail Ass'n (Mo.
App. 1920) 221 S. W. 752; Phillips v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1921) 288 Mo.
175, 231 S. W. 947; Cardinale v. Kemp (1925) 309 Mo. 241, 274 S. W. 437;
Harding v. Federal Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 198;
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